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Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Posted 30.01.2009

Recent markets developments and the answers public authorities and regulators have so far given to the challenges they pause certainly create cause for concerns and reflexion on the sources of the crisis, the financial system, the pertinence of the behaviour of public authorities, and the impact on the financial system as a whole. It also should drive changes in the way institutions are regulated, but more importantly, on how risks are apprehended and measured.

Reasons for the markets instability witnessed over the past 18 months have been debated and discussed a number of times. It seems therefore reasonable to assume that they are well known and relatively well understood. However, the market – and more worryingly its regulators- seem taken of guard every time a new casualty appears, generating some suspicion as to how much awareness and understanding there is globally. Let us therefore attempt to draw a framework that will put some structure around the chaos currently unfolding.

How did it all got started?

All started with the subprime crisis. A segment of the mortgage market became out of favour, on the premises that delinquency rated were on the way up due to an expected slowdown in the world’s growth rate. This became quite suddenly an evidence to finance industry although the theme had been herald by a number of market participants for a number of months; some had even built significant positions ahead of the events, generating at the time at best incredulous reactions.  Overnight, every institution faced the difficult task of evaluating the exposure they had to this segment, and the likely resulting loss. They started to look into their balance sheet to find out. What they found out took them by surprise and this was that they could not really say. The Structured Bonds they held would not allow them to understand exactly what kind of risk they were exposed to; or at least not in sufficient detail. The loss of granularity was such that they could neither determine the scale of their exposure, nor the pain they should expect to take. They could not really estimate the value or the risk of significant part of their balance sheet.  They then turned to the market to find the answer; many of them; at the same time. The resulting unbalance triggered the events and the rest of the story is known. Before exploring the contamination mechanism, let us spend a moment on what happened then and why, more importantly. A Brief History of Recent Times

The long lock up conundrum

Posted 15.01.2009

Introduction

With many ‘star names’ in the hedge fund industry being able to use their clout to lock up investor assets for lengthy periods, the notion that illiquidity is a price worth paying for better performance should be scrutinized. This paper will analyse how the performance of ‘long lock up’ funds compares to the performance of their cousins who do not impose such punitive conditions on investors whilst assessing comparative performance in difficult market conditions.

Funds examined

For the purpose of the paper, the definition of long lock up fund applies to hedge fund holdings with a liquidity of greater than 2 years. Since data on long lock up funds is not so widely available, we could only use 8 long lock up funds held by our clients for the paper. Details of the funds are listed below with the fund names withheld to preserve confidentiality agreements Analysis long lockup performance

Confession of a Risk Manager

Posted 15.09.2008

In August 2008, the Economist printed an article called “Confessions of a Risk Manager”. We have taken some key points out, hopefully for the reader’s benefit.

Expect the unlikely:

“The possibility that liquidity could suddenly dry up was always a topic high on our list, but we could only see more liquidity coming in the market and not going out of it.”

“A 20% drop on assets with virtually no default risk was inconceivable – though this did eventually occur.”

Look for clues:confessions of a risk manager

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